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Abstract
The prefrontal cortex is vital for a range of cognitive processes, including working memory, attention, and decision-making.
Notably, its absence impairs the performance of tasks requiring the maintenance of information through a delay period. In
this paper, we formulate a rodent task—which requires maintenance of delay-period activity—as a Markov decision process
and treat optimal task performance as an (active) inference problem. We simulate the behavior of a Bayes optimal mouse
presented with 1 of 2 cues that instructs the selection of concurrent visual and auditory targets on a trial-by-trial basis.
Formulating inference as message passing, we reproduce features of neuronal coupling within and between prefrontal
regions engaged by this task. We focus on the micro-circuitry that underwrites delay-period activity and relate it to
functional specialization within the prefrontal cortex in primates. Finally, we simulate the electrophysiological correlates of
inference and demonstrate the consequences of lesions to each part of our in silico prefrontal cortex. In brief, this
formulation suggests that recurrent excitatory connections—which support persistent neuronal activity—encode beliefs
about transition probabilities over time. We argue that attentional modulation can be understood as the contextualization
of sensory input by these persistent beliefs.
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Introduction
Beyond classical reflexes, most interesting behaviors rely upon
the use of past information to plan future actions. This implies
a temporal discrepancy between a sensation and the action
informed by that sensation (Fuster 1990; Coull et al. 2010). For
example, during scene construction, visual data garnered from
previous fixations inform where we will look next (Mirza et al.
2016; Parr and Friston 2017a). In conversation, our interpreta-
tion of, and response to, the last word in a sentence depends
upon the first (Montgomery 1995). Imitation involves viewing
before replicating another’s movements (Mary et al. 1988). The
prefrontal cortex appears to be crucial for solving problems that
involve temporal dependencies of this type. Early neuropsycho-
logical works (Ferrier 1886; Luria 1980; Szczepanski and Knight
2014), including primate lesion studies (Jacobsen 1935; Harlow
et al. 1952), suggest a deficit in “immediate recall” following
damage to frontal lobe areas. Subsequently, it has been shown
that prefrontal regions are vital for the performance of “delay-
period” working memory tasks (Fuster and Alexander 1970;
Passingham 1985; Owen et al. 1990) and that these regions house
cells that exhibit persistent activity during delays (Fuster 1973;
Funahashi et al. 1989). Furthermore, accounts of the role of the
(medial) prefrontal cortex in emotional decision-making call
upon future (interoceptive) sensory consequences of a decision
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(Damasio 1996). These all imply an important role for the pre-
frontal cortex inmaking inferences based upon the past and the
future.
To attempt to understand the computational architecture
required for temporally deep behaviors, we derive a Bayes opti-
mal solution to a delay-period task that has recently been used
in rodent studies (Wimmer et al. 2015; Schmitt et al. 2017) and
is closely analogous to tasks used for human research (Barceló
et al. 2000; Griffin and Nobre 2003; Lepsien and Nobre 2007;
Astle et al. 2009; Kuo et al. 2009; Lepsien et al. 2011). The task
calls upon inferences about an attentional context, based upon
a cue. This information must be maintained through a delay
period and thenused to informa behavioral outcome.Successful
performance of the task requires a capacity to contextualize new
information based on what has previously been observed and
to use past information whenmaking a decision. The prefrontal
cortex is uniquely placed to coordinate this task, due to its dense
connectivity with a range of brain areas. This property, some-
times described in terms of “rich-club hubs” (van den Heuvel
and Sporns 2011), facilitates the context-sensitive (cognitively
flexible) inferences that must be performed during this task.
In this study, we treat this task as an inference problem
and describe the computational machinery that a Bayes optimal
agent might use to solve this problem. Our aim is to relate these
inferential processes to the neuronal architectures found in the
prefrontal cortex and to the connections between regions of the
frontal cortices. In the following, we start with an overview of
active inference. We then describe the form of the generative
model required for this task and of the message passing (Winn
and Bishop 2005; Dauwels 2007) it entails. Finally, we simulate
the electrophysiological correlates of the implicit belief updating
(Friston et al. 2017a) in distinct cell populations in a synthetic
prefrontal cortex—and show the effects of simulated lesions on
this updating.
In short, this paper tries to establish the construct validity
of Bayesian belief updating—in the setting of deep temporal
models—in relation to empirical electrophysiology (e.g., delay-
period activity) and neuropsychology (e.g., damage to the lateral
prefrontal cortex). In subsequent work, we will use this scheme
to characterize interactions between the prefrontal cortex and
thalamus based upon behavior and in vivo electrophysiology,
using the same experimental paradigm simulated below.
Active Inference
Active inference is a formal approach to describing optimal
behavior (Friston et al. 2010) that derives from the need for
animals to engage in “self-evidencing” behavior (Hohwy 2016).
This imperative becomes obvious when we consider a concrete
example. For a person to exist, their temperature must remain
around 37◦C. As such, a measurement (by a thermoreceptor)
of a temperature at this value carries a greater evidence for
the person’s continued existence than a measurement of −5◦C.
For a person to actively maintain themselves, it follows that
they should actively seek out sensory data that provide self-
evidence. It is this notion of self-evidencing that underwrites the
first-principles account on offer here and is the same principle
that has been used to reproduce a range of other phenomena
in neuroscience (e.g., visual search behavior (Mirza et al. 2016),
navigation and planning (Bruineberg et al. 2018; Kaplan and
Friston 2018), curiosity (Friston et al. 2017b), reading (Friston
et al. 2017d), action-observation (Friston et al. 2011), neglect
syndromes (Parr and Friston 2017b), and hallucinations (Adams
et al. 2013; Benrimoh et al. 2018; Parr et al. 2018)). This appeal to a
common objective function (i.e., evidence for a generativemodel
of the sensorium) across all these domains distinguishes the
approach used here from alternative approaches to modeling
behavior.
We can formalize this notion by defining some distribution
over sensory observations, P(o˜) (where o˜ =
[
o1, o2, . . . , oT
]T
). The
most probable observations are those that carry the greatest
self-evidence and, a priori, constitute the preferred outcomes
for the creature in question. The processes generating these
sensations may be very complex, and so it is generally more
efficient and tractable to evaluate a lower bound on the (log)
evidence above and to seek to maximize the bound. This bound
is the negative free energy (Dayan et al. 1995; Beal 2003):
− F (π)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Free energy
= EQ
[
ln
P
(
o˜, s˜|π)
Q
(
s˜|π)
]
≤ lnEQ
[
P
(
o˜, s˜|π)
Q
(
s˜|π)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Jensen’s inequality
= lnP (o˜|π)︸ ︷︷ ︸
log evidence
In machine learning and statistics, this is known as an evi-
dence lower bound. Here, we have introduced the trajectories
of hidden (i.e., latent) states (s) that cause sensory observations,
and their dependence on policies (π ) that denote sequences of
actions. For the above inequality to hold,Q may be any arbitrary
distribution. However, if we try to maximize the log evidence by
minimizing the free energy (under the constraint that Q sums to
1), this distribution acquires an interesting interpretation. Rear-
ranging the expression for the free energy gives the following:
F (π) = DKL
[
Q
(
s˜|π) ∥∥∥P (s˜|o˜,π)]− lnP (o˜|π) .
The first term on the right-hand side means that the free
energy is minimal when Q approximates the posterior distri-
bution (Beal 2003). In short, self-evidencing appears to require
perceptual inference, in the sense that a belief is formed that
approximates the probability of the causes of sensations. Note
that the term “belief” is used here in the technical sense of
Bayesian belief updating—not to indicate a conscious, proposi-
tional belief. A convenient way to define Q is to use a mean field
approximation (Feynman 1998):
Q
(
s˜,π
) = Q (π)∏
τ
Q (sτ |π) .
All that remains to define the free energy is to specify prob-
ability distribution over states and outcomes P(o˜, s˜|π), which is
known as the generative model. This expresses the beliefs an
animal has about the way in which its sensations or outcomes
are generated by states of the world that finds itself in. The
generative model can be factorized to give the following:
P
(
o˜, s˜|π) = P (s1)∏
τ
P (oτ |sτ ) P (sτ+1|sτ ,π (τ)) .
The form of these distributions is illustrated in Figure 1. This
shows that there is a sequence of hidden states that evolve
through time. At each time-step, these give rise to observable
sensory data. The sequence of hidden states depends upon the
policy pursued (Mirza et al. 2016). This formulation frames policy
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Figure 1. Markov decision process. The Bayesian network on the upper left shows the graphical representation of a Markov decision process. Technically, this is a
partially observed Markov decision process, as the hidden states cannot be directly observed. Arrows between variables indicate conditional probabilities. The circles
represent random variables that comprise observable outcomes (o), states (s), and policies, (π ). Subscripts indicate time. The panel on the upper right shows the form of
the (categorical) probability distributions that define thismodel. The prior distribution over policies is a softmax (normalized exponential) function of the expected free
energy under each policy. The lower part of this figure summarizes active inference in terms of the reciprocal interactions between perception and action, following
accounts of the prefrontal cortex as a temporal bridge in the perception–action cycle (Fuster 1990). On the left, we show the equations that describe this cycle. On the
right, we illustrate this graphically, emphasizing the propagation of beliefs through time. Starting from the back of the brain, sensory areas send messages to higher
regions encoding beliefs about the causes of those sensations. These beliefs are propagated forwards in time, allowing for a plan of action (Barceló and Cooper 2018)
into the future (presumably evaluated in cortico-striatal loops). Once a policy has been inferred, this is used to select an action (u). Actions then cause changes in the
physical world (e.g., movement of the eyes) that influence the sensory data obtained, allowing the cycle to start again. G, Expected Free energy; D, initial state prior; B,
transition probabilities betweenhidden states;A, likelihoodmapping fromhidden states to outcomes. Please see Table 1 for a glossary of the variables used in this paper.
selection (planning) as a selection among different possible
courses of action. Importantly, it also entails beliefs about the
hidden states in the future and in the past. As we will see later,
it is this temporal depth that underwrites workingmemory (Parr
and Friston 2017d) as a key aspect of active inference. Although
the equations in Figure 1 may look complicated, the generative
model is relatively straightforward and generic in its form. The
key parameters of this sort ofmodel can be divided intoA,B, and
C. The Amatrix describes the likelihood of any outcome given a
hidden state, while a series of B matrices encode the transition
probabilities among different hidden states (that depend upon
the policy in play). Finally, the C matrix specifies prior beliefs
about outcomes that underwrite self-evidencing.
The best policies to select are those that lead to the lowest
free energy in the future. To ensure that this is the case, we
define a prior belief that the smaller the expected free energy,
the greater the probability of pursuing that policy. The expected
free energy is defined as follows:
G (π) = EQ˜
[
lnQ
(
s˜|π)− ln P (o˜, s˜)]
≈ −EQ(o˜|π)
[
DKL
[
Q
(
s˜|o˜) ∥∥∥Q (s˜|π)]]− EQ˜ [lnP (o˜)]
Q˜
(
o˜, s˜|π) = Q (s˜|π) P (o˜|s˜)
.
Note that we have augmented the approximate posterior
used for the expectation so that it now includes an expectation
over yet-to-be-observed sensory data. This acknowledges the
complex interplay between action and sensation (Busse et al.
2017). The final term in the second line is the expectation of
the values in the C matrix that specify prior preferences about
outcomes—as defined in Figure 1. It is these prior beliefs that
ensure the mouse will behave so that it ends up fulfilling its
prior preferences. The first termmandates exploratory behavior,
which is important in some contexts (Friston et al. 2015; Parr and
Friston 2017c), but less so for the current task—as our task does
not permit any foraging.
The representation of policies as deep temporal sequences of
actions resonates with the notion that the prefrontal cortex acts
as a temporal bridge in the perception–action cycle (Fuster 1990).
Figure 1 illustrates this idea in relation to the formal perception–
action cycle implied by active inference—and summarizes the
discussion above. In the next section, we define the genera-
tive model used for our task and appeal to the process theory
(Friston et al. 2017a, 2017c) associated with active inference
to describe the requisite neuronal message passing (Winn and
Bishop 2005; Dauwels 2007). In brief, this (variational) message
passing involves passing sufficient statistics between neurons
or neuronal populations. The sufficient statistics encode poste-
rior beliefs about things that need to be inferred, namely, hidden
states of the world and the policy being pursued. Here, the
sufficient statistics are just the expected probability of being in
a particular state—or pursuing a particular policy. The requisite
message passing can be formulated as a gradient descent on
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Table 1 Glossary of variables
Variable Definition
F Free energy
G Expected free energy
π Policy posterior
sπτ State posterior belief (for a given policy and time)
oπτ Outcome belief (for a given policy and time)
oτ Observed outcome
Aij = P(oτ = i|sτ = j) Likelihood matrix (mapping states to outcomes)
Bij(u) = P(sτ+1 = i|sτ = j,π(τ) = u) Transition matrix (mapping states to states)
Cτ i = P(oτ = i) Outcome prior
Di = P(s1 = i) Initial state prior
Hi =
∑
j
P(oτ = j|sτ = i) ln P(oτ = j|sτ = i) Entropy of the likelihood mapping
Figure 2.The generative model. The generative model we have used has a likelihood distribution that evolves over time. In this schematic, we illustrate the conditional
dependencies between hidden states (pink panels) and sensory observations (blue panels) at each time point. During the delay period, sensations are conditionally
independent of all states (i.e., there are no informative sensory data). The likelihood (A) matrices are shown below each sensory modality. All transition (B) matrices
are identity matrices, except for the choice state. This depends upon the action selected by our synthetic mouse and allows it to transition from “no choice” (white
circle) to the green or blue choices. Preferences (C matrix) are uniform for all outcome modalities, except the feedback modality. There is a preference, at the fourth
time-step, for being correct over being incorrect. The initial prior beliefs (D) for all but the choice state are uniform. There is a prior belief that the first choice state will
be the “no choice.” In practice, we model the time-dependency of the A matrix by conditioning it on an additional (time) hidden state, not shown here. The lower part
of the schematic shows the course of a single trial. At the start, the mouse is presented with an auditory cue (blue or brown noise). This indicates either the “attend to
vision” or the “attend to audition” rule. After a delay period, visual and auditory stimuli are presented. The mouse ignores the irrelevant stimulus and attends to the
relevant one, ensuring it makes the correct choice, receiving positive feedback (milk). A failure to choose or the incorrect choice leads to negative feedback (no milk).
variational free energy,which provides a plausible account of the
neuronal dynamics.
The neuronal processing scheme adopted in this work may
appear a little complicated and ad hoc. However, unlike alterna-
tive schemes (e.g., policy optimization) this is a “first principle”
scheme that optimizes a single quantity (a variational bound
on Bayesian model evidence). It is important to appreciate that
this (message passing) scheme has been used in a series of
studies, reproducing a wide range of phenomena, from working
memory and attention during saccadic eye movements through
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Figure 3. Intrinsic connectivity and neuronal message passing. The equations on the left show the form of the variational message passing mandated by active
inference. On the right, we represent these in the form of a neuronal network. Blue connections are inhibitory, and red are excitatory. The input layer is labeled layer
IV for consistency with patterns of laminar connectivity in the cortex (Zeki and Shipp 1988; Felleman and Van Essen 1991; Shipp 2007). Layer III houses the cells
representing the sufficient statistics of posterior beliefs. It is these that are connected through di-synaptic recurrent excitatory connections and lateral inhibitory
connections. The notation snπτ means the expected hidden state factor n at time τ , conditioned on a policy. The quantity z is a normalizing constant (or partition
function), while v and ε are auxiliary variables that play the roles of membrane depolarization and prediction error, respectively. The network illustrated here is
supposed to showhowpopulations of neurons interactwith one another to performvariational inference.This implies a representation of beliefs in terms of population
averages (or other population codes). While we have shown excitatory and inhibitory connections arising from the same populations, this is not intended to imply a
violation of Dale’s law, but instead implies intermediate inhibitory interneurons (that are omitted for clarity).
to epistemic foraging in T-mazes—from evidence accumulation
in neuroeconomics games to simulating curiosity and rule learn-
ing (Moutoussis et al. 2014; Friston et al. 2015, 2017b; Mirza
et al. 2016). The only thing that differs among these (and the
current) applications is the implicit model of how states of the
world generate outcomes. Furthermore, the implicit message
passing is neuronally plausible, relying upon a series of linear
mixtures and nonlinear transformations (Friston et al. 2017d;
Parr et al. 2019). This belief updating for generative models of
discrete states (i.e., hidden Markov models and partially observ-
ableMarkov decision processes) can be regarded as equivalent to
predictive coding for continuous states (i.e., state spacemodels).
The formal equivalence is discussed at length in the setting of
the graphical brain (Friston et al. 2017c).
The Generative Model
The simulations used in this paper are based upon the
implementation of active inference—under Markov decision
processes—described above. This implementation has been
used to simulate a large range of electrophysiological and
psychophysical phenomena in visual neuroscience (e.g.,
saccadic eye movements), through to higher cognitive functions
(e.g., abstract rule learning). Each application uses exactly the
same computational architecture andmessage passing scheme.
The unique aspect of each application rests upon the particular
generative model appropriate for the task or paradigm at hand.
In this section, we consider a minimal generative model that is
apt for the taskwe have chosen to characterize context-sensitive
delay-period activity.
The task is structured as illustrated in the lower part of
Figure 2 (Wimmer et al. 2015). First, an auditory cue is pre-
sented. This is followed by a delay period and then simultaneous
auditory and visual target stimuli. Depending upon the identity
of the predelay cue, the mouse should attend to its visual or
auditory modality after the delay. The cued modality tells the
mouse whether it should choose the left or right option. Fol-
lowing its choice, the mouse is given feedback (in the form of
milk or no milk). In Figure 2, we show the form of the generative
model required to perform the task described above. There are
3 types of hidden state. These are the rule, the target, and
the choice. The mapping from each of these hidden states to
sensory outcomes changes with each time-step. Initially, there
is an identity mapping between rule states and the cue. During
a delay period, there are no sensory data generated (i.e., each
modality constitutes a “null” or uninformative outcome). At the
third time-step, visual and auditory stimuli are generated from
the target state, but in a way that depends upon the rule. If the
rule is “attend vision,” there is an identity mapping from the
target to the visual modality and an uninformative mapping to
the auditory modality. These mappings are reversed if the rule
is “attend audition.” These mappings of the generative model
express the beliefs that the attended modality contains useful
information, while the unattended modality is imprecise and is
uninformative about the correct target. During the final (fourth)
time-step, feedback is given.This depends upon the choicemade
and on whether it matches the correct target. A failure to make
a choice leads to an incorrect outcome. A priori, our simulated
(murine) subject expects to be correct (and receive milk). This
means that it infers it will follow the course of action most
consistent with this prior belief.
While the generativemodel we have employed here is clearly
specific to the task in question, it includes several features com-
monly found in cognitive tasks (Funahashi et al. 1989; Griffin and
Nobre 2003; Lepsien and Nobre 2007; Astle et al. 2009; Lepsien et
al. 2011; Pertzov et al. 2013). Most obviously, the propagation of
beliefs through time—such that beliefs about states early in a
multi-step sequence influence beliefs about states later on. The
sort of message passing required to perform this kind of task,
regardless of the specific outcome modalities, must include a
similar transition structure, where beliefs about states in future
may be confidently predicted based upon those in the past or
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present. This suggests that,while the form of the Amatrices and
the sensory data they represent may vary from task-to-task, the
need for precise Bmatrices—and their associated recurrent con-
nectivity (Fig. 3)—may be a more generic feature of sequential
processing in working memory tasks.
Anatomy
Intrinsic Connectivity
To maintain a representation of something beyond the duration
of a stimulus presentation, 2 things are crucial. The first is
persistence of neuronal activity—this is often referred to as
“delay-period” activity (Funahashi 2015). The second is a clear
separation between alternative representations (i.e., the “tun-
ing” of memory cells; Murray et al. 2014). The latter is vital for
the specificity of the former. These 2 properties have been inves-
tigated extensively through electrophysiology and anatomical
tract tracing, and the neurobiological machinery that support
each has been well characterized (Coull 1998; Goldman-Rakic
2011; Arnsten 2013). Delay-period activity is supported by recur-
rent glutamatergic connections within layer III of the lateral pre-
frontal cortex (Kritzer and Goldman-Rakic 1995). This ensures
populations of pyramidal cells may remain persistently active
through local (at most di-synaptic) connectivity (Constantinidis
et al. 2001). The tuning of prefrontal pyramidal cells depends
upon inhibitory interneurons (Constantinidis and Goldman-Ra-
kic 2002) and is destroyed by GABA antagonists (Rao et al. 2000).
Interestingly, these 2 features turn out to be emergent proper-
ties of a system that engages in active inference. Figure 3 shows
the form of the neuronalmessage passing required for inference
about states under the generative model in Figure 1 (Friston
et al. 2017d). This exhibits recurrent excitatory (di-synaptic)
connections and inhibitory interneurons—and affords a compu-
tational interpretation of their function. Excitatory connections
(labeled 2, 3, and 6) reflect the fact that beliefs at one time
should inform beliefs about events in both the future and the
past. The strength (or gain) of these connections determines the
degree to which beliefs about the past constrain the present,
and vice versa (and similarly for the present and the future).
Technically, this manifests in a generative model as a precision
(inverse variance) of beliefs about transitions. To maintain a
belief over time, as required in this task, this precision must be
sufficiently high. In the section on neuropsychology later, we
will see the effect of disrupting this precision on maintenance
of internal representations over time. A set of inhibitory connec-
tions (labeled 7) act to ensure that 2 opposing beliefs cannot be
held simultaneously. In other words, if one possibility becomes
more probable, it must be the case that alternatives become less
so. It is easy to see how the loss of this constraint (through loss of
GABAergic signaling) results in the loss of precise tuning curves
(Rao et al. 2000).
Extrinsic Connectivity
Above, we described the intrinsic connectivity within a pre-
frontal region and the computations it could support. We now
turn to the connectivity between regions of prefrontal cortex
and consider how the computations described above may align
with functional anatomy. This should not be taken too seriously
from an anatomical perspective but provides a useful vehicle
to unpack the sorts of computational architectures implied by
the generative model used here, particularly with reference to
the influence of different hidden state factors over one another.
Furthermore, it will be useful in formalizing the influences of
various synthetic lesions in an anatomically informed manner
in the neuropsychology section below. Prefrontal regions, in pri-
mates,have a topography defined in part by the patterns of input
from other areas. Loosely speaking, in the lateral part, ventral
areas tend to receive input from the “what” pathways (i.e., infor-
mation about identity from ventral visual and auditory areas),
while the dorsal regions receive input from “where” pathways
(carrying spatial information; Wilson et al. 1993; Romanski et al.
1999). The visual and auditory stimuli in our generative model,
and the choices, may be interpreted either as representing 2
alternative spatial locations or as 2 alternative objects. Although
the intrinsic connectivity remains identical, the former speaks
to a dorsal representation and the latter to engagement of
ventral prefrontal circuitry.
Medial parts of the prefrontal cortex, including the orbito-
frontal and anterior cingulate regions (Barbas and García–
Cabezas 2016), are the targets of structures associated with
interoceptive sensation (Price et al. 1996; Groenewegen and
Uylings 2000; Ghashghaei and Barbas 2002). Together, these
observations imply a dorsal–ventral axis representing location
to identity (sometimes characterized as “how” and “what”;
O’Reilly 2010) and a lateral–medial axis representing exterocep-
tive to interoceptive terminations (sometimes called “cold” and
“hot”; O’Reilly 2010). Some authors additionally propose a caudal
to rostral axis corresponding to levels of hierarchical abstraction
(Badre and D’Esposito 2009). Given that higher levels in a hierar-
chy tend to represent states that evolve over longer time periods
(Hasson et al. 2008), this is highly consistent with recent findings
that training in working memory tasks induces plastic changes
in more anterior (i.e., abstract) parts of the prefrontal cortex
(Riley et al. 2018).
Clearly this is a caricature of prefrontal anatomy (e.g.,
orbitofrontal regions are also in receipt of exteroceptive
information; Barrett et al. 2013), but it is a useful one as it
affords the opportunity to form empirical hypotheses about
the electrophysiological responses in different regions of
prefrontal cortex and makes predictions about the sorts of
deficits expected following lesions that are answerable to
neuropsychological data. For more detailed and nuanced
accounts of prefrontal organization, please see Price et al.
(1996), Barbas and Zikopoulos (2007), Barbas (2015), and Nee
and D’Esposito (2016).
The task we have described depends upon all of the variables
outlined above, as the rule is cued through 1 of 2 distinct sounds,
the stimuli to attend to are visual and auditory, and the feedback
(milk) has interoceptive consequences. The former areas require
inputs from visual and auditory areas, implicating the lateral
part of the cortex. The latter needs input from gustatory
regions, such as the insula cortex, or regions representing
emotionally salient stimuli, such as the amygdala, suggesting
medial prefrontal areas (Mufson et al. 1981; Devinsky et al.
1995; Gu et al. 2013). This is consistent with the suggestion
that medial prefrontal areas, including the orbitofrontal
cortex, might be involved in “value”-based inferences (Wal-
lis 2011) or in representing action–outcome contingencies
(O’Callaghan et al. 2018).
The interaction between beliefs about different hidden state
factors depends upon their jointly generated sensory outcomes,
i.e., sitting within each other’s Markov blanket as the parents
of the same children (Pearl 2014). The cue stimulus, before
the delay, depends only upon the rule state. In contrast, the
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Figure 4. Extrinsic connectivity. The schematic on the left illustrates the types
of input that reach different parts of the prefrontal cortex. Exteroceptive modal-
ities tend to target lateral parts, while structures associated with interoceptive
inference (Seth 2013; Barrett and Simmons 2015) project to more medial regions.
These inputs may be informative about more than one hidden state. This is
expressed through modulatory connections between regions that act to contex-
tualize the incoming sensory information (term 1 in the equations in Fig. 3). On
the right, we provide an example of this. At the third time-step, immediately
after the delay period, the input to target cells is given a context by the beliefs
about the rule (derived from the sensory input 2 time-steps previously). This
controls the gain of connections from each sensory modality to the target cells.
Technically, this interaction occurs due to the fact that the rule and the target
occupy each other’sMarkov blankets (in virtue of their jointly causing outcomes).
This implies a reciprocal interaction, such that regions representing one should
connect to those representing the other, and vice versa. Anatomically speaking,
this means that prefrontal regions that interact with one another should show
bidirectional connectivity.These connectionsmay be betweenhierarchical levels
(Kiebel et al. 2008), or may be lateral modulatory influences.
visual and auditory cues depend upon both the rule and the
target (Fig. 4). This means that, during perceptual inference,
beliefs about the rule should contextualize the mapping from
visual and auditory modalities to the cells representing the
target. Similarly, the feedback depends upon both the target
and the choice, implying the 2 should modulate one another.
As illustrated in Figure 4, these conditional dependencies sug-
gest regions representing rules and targets should modulate
one another, as should those representing targets and choices.
Note the qualitative correspondence between the connectivity
between these 3 sets of beliefs (about each hidden state factor)
and the anatomical patterning of the 3 modes of activity identi-
fied with different stages of a working memory task (Markowitz
et al. 2015).
Figure 4 illustrates the form of the modulatory influence
rule cells exhibit over the connections from visual and audi-
tory modalities. This mediates a form of context-dependent
gain control (Parr and Friston 2017c) analogous to that used to
account for endogenous attention (Feldman and Friston 2010).
In brief, attention to 1 of the 2 sensory modalities is the process
of ascribing a greater precision to the likelihood distribution
mapping hidden states to that type of outcome. When the rule
“attend to vision” is inferred, this leads to the deployment of an
identity likelihood matrix (that is infinitely precise) generating
visual data, and a uniform (zero precision) distribution gener-
ating auditory signals. The latter renders beliefs about targets
conditionally independent from auditory inputs. An inference
that the rule is “attend to audition” would reverse these matri-
ces. The modulation of these inputs by prefrontal regions is
consistent with empirical work that highlights the importance
of such regions in the coordination of attention (Rossi et al. 2008).
Electrophysiology
In this section, we solve the equations in Figure 3 (and the
appendix), through simulation, for the task outlined above. The
formof these equations allows us to associate variableswith ide-
alized electrophysiological measurements (Friston et al. 2017a).
The auxiliary variable vplays the role of a postsynaptic potential,
computed from the inputs from other neurons. This is trans-
formed to s, and it is this signal that is propagated to other
neuronal populations, analogous to a firing rate. This allows us
to associate the rate of change of vwith the local field potentials
(LFPs) caused by depolarizations, and swith the signalmeasured
through single unit recordings. Figure 5 shows these responses
for each population of neurons (those representing the rule,
target, and final choice).
The key aspect of these synthetic neuronal responses rests
upon the deep temporal models used to update beliefs and
accumulate evidence for the time and context-dependent states
of the world. The very fact that our simulated mice can remem-
ber and plan rests upon the representation of the past and
future in terms of (the sufficient statistics of) posterior beliefs—
as encoded by neuronal firing. This suggests there is a “place
coding for time” in the prefrontal cortex, or indeed any part of
the brain that participates in the inversion of deep temporal
models. A subtle but instructive aspect of this implicit short-
term memory—for the past and future—rests upon the way
sensory outcomes are generated over a given epoch of time (e.g.,
the successive phases of a trial). By construction, the inference
scheme assigns representations to various time points from
the beginning to the end of an epoch. This means that at the
beginning of a trial most neurons (or populations) are encoding
posterior beliefs about the future, while at the end of the trial
they encode posterior beliefs about the past—which have been
updated on the basis of sensory evidence. This equips the mice
with the capacity to both predict and postdict as anticipation
turns into short-term memory, as each neuron’s designated
time approaches and passes. Figure 5 illustrates this in terms
of simulated neuronal responses that are plotted with the time
through the trial along the x-axis and the time represented by
the neurons along the y-axis.
The implication here is that delay-period activity is a nec-
essary and emergent property of any belief updating based on
models that generate the sensory consequence of actions that,
by definition, can only occur in the future. Furthermore, the
context sensitivity of these consequences necessarily implies
a modulation of (synaptic) coupling that determines the onset
an offset of delay-period activity. On this view, delay-period
activity is neither purely anticipatory, nor purely mnemonic. It
represents the accumulation of evidence for various states of the
world that provide a context in which different sorts of latent or
hidden states are updated distinct neuronal populations.
In our simulations, the time course of the responses in each
neuronal population is different, consistent with empirical
data (Fuster 1973; Fuster et al. 1982; Koechlin et al. 2003;
Hunt et al. 2015). This suggests it should be possible to use
electrophysiological data to discriminate between the neurons
playing each role. Note that the rule cells rapidly increase or
decrease their firing rates at the time of the cue presentation,
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Figure 5. Simulated electrophysiology. These plots show the electrophysiological responses simulated for each of the 3 unit representations during the trial shown
in Figure 1. The upper row shows the responses we would expect to record from single cells in these populations. These are presented in a “raster plot” format, with
higher firing rates represented as denser regions. Each column within these plots represents a population of neurons. Neurons shown at the top of the column encode
beliefs about the first time-step in a trial. Those at the bottom encode beliefs about the final time. The red boxes indicate the neurons that encode beliefs about the
present. Those above these boxes encode beliefs about the past, and those below encode beliefs about the future. The second row of plots shows the same information
in a slightly different format. Each line represents a different neuron (i.e., a row from the raster plot) and shows the trajectory of firing rates over time. The lower row
of plots shows the simulated LFPs. All 3 rows are temporally aligned.
consistent with measured cells in the rodent prefrontal cortex
(Schmitt et al. 2017), and with human neuroimaging data
(Woolgar et al. 2011). This is accompanied by a large LFP.
They maintain persistent activity throughout the delay period
and remainder of the trial (Funahashi et al. 1989). Target
cells, representing the correct option, become active when
the visual and auditory stimuli are presented. They should
respond to a particular auditory stimulus for 1 rule (and
should be unresponsive to visual stimuli), with the same cells
responding to a particular visual stimulus when the other rule is
in play.
The simulated electrophysiology shown in Figure 5 serves 3
key purposes. First, it lends a construct validity to the inferential
perspective (and generative model) we have used, in the sense
that these results would not be unexpected in real electrophys-
iological measurements. Second, it offers an intuition as to the
belief-updating process used by the simulated mice to solve the
task. This will be important for the neuropsychology section
that follows, where changes to the generative model (i.e., syn-
thetic lesions) have consequences for how this belief-updating
unfolds. Finally, this means we can derive quantitative predic-
tions about measured electrophysiology from animal behavior
and use these predictions to investigate the representation of
beliefs in prefrontal cortical (and subcortical) circuits.
An advantage of being able to simulate behavior—and the
electrophysiological correlates of the inferential processes that
underwrite this behavior—is the opportunity to assess the pre-
dictive validity of these models, against empirical behavior. By
fitting the model outlined above to behavioral (choice) data
(see, e.g., Mirza et al. 2018), we can estimate the parameters of
the generative model (i.e., prior beliefs) for individual animals.
These can then be used to generate simulated electrophysio-
logical data of the sort shown in Figure 5, specific to a given
mouse, which are then answerable to real data recorded from
the prefrontal cortex of the same mouse. This means we can
ask whether it is possible to predict neuronal responses based
upon observed behavior. Figure 6 provides a simple example of
how this sort of analysis could be performed.
The simulations in this section assume that the genera-
tive model is a good description of the way in which stim-
uli are presented to the mouse throughout the task, i.e., they
comply with the good regulator theorem (Conant and Ashby
1970). This means the simulated mice do not make any errors.
However, real mice are much more likely to get things wrong,
and it is important to account for this. The electrophysiologi-
cal responses shown here provide one way of looking at this.
For example, it is clear that a failure to maintain delay-period
activity would make it impossible to infer the correct choice
at the end. This would lead to a random choice between the
2 alternatives, with errors on half of the trials (if this were a
complete failure to maintain this delay period). This raises the
following question: what would need to change in the set-up
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Figure 6. An example analysis. This figure illustrates how this approach could be used to assess the predictive validity of the model in relation to empirical data.
This example uses a standard multivariate approach known as Canonical Variates Analysis (CVA) to test whether some linear mixture of explanatory variables in a
design matrix predicts some pattern (mixture) of multivariate data. The basic approach is shown above for a simulated analysis. This is intended to illustrate how
one might employ this model in an empirical setting (i.e., no interpretations should be drawn from the synthetic results shown here). The design matrix shows the
simulated (average) firing rates for the neurons representing rules, targets, and choices for an example trial (as in Fig. 5). This could be generated using parameters
estimated from behavioral data (crucially, not from the electrophysiological data). Each column represents a neuronal population, and each row represents a time-step
through the trial. The “data” matrix here is constructed by multiplying the design matrix with a randomly generated matrix, so that each column of the data matrix
is distinct linear mixture of the columns of the design matrix (i.e., emulating a distributed representation of beliefs through time) and adding some noise (with the
signal-to-noise ratio of 8). In a real analysis, the data matrix would be constructed frommeasured neural time-series (following averaging and smoothing), where each
column is a neuron, and each row a time-bin. In our example, CVA finds evidence in favor of 3 canonical variates that each represent a linear mixture of the data and
a linear mixture of the simulated data. As shown in the upper right plot, one can now assess the degree to which each pattern of the belief trajectories predicts its
associated pattern of observed responses (i.e., the neural correlates of belief updating). The weights shown in the canonical vectors constitute a profile of responses
that enable inferences about functional segregation (e.g., a pattern that implicates only those neurons from a particular sub-region of the prefrontal cortex).
of the generative model for Bayes optimal inference to fail to
propagate beliefs about the rule forwards through time?
The answer to this question comes from the Intrinsic
Connectivity section above, which discusses the recurrent
glutamatergic connections that maintain delay-period activity.
Figure 3 equates these connections with the B matrix that
constrains the future based upon the present. This implies that
these connections, and therefore the delay-period activity, will
be attenuated when the past is believed to be less predictive of
the present (i.e., in the presence of imprecise dynamics). This
highlights the importance of precise beliefs about temporal
dynamics in order to contextualize beliefs about the present
(c.f. “distrusting the present”; Hohwy et al. 2016). We will see
an extreme example of this failure in the Neuropsychology
section below. More concisely, performance errors result from a
generative model that does not reflect how the data presented
to the mouse were actually generated. This is not to say that
such models are suboptimal. Clearly the future cannot always
be predicted perfectly, based upon the present; so, it may be
that imprecise prior beliefs about environmental dynamics are
perfectly consistent with the good regulator theorem, when
considering the data mice contend with, while not performing
this task.
Having established a degree of construct validity, in rela-
tion to empirical delay-period activity and its context-sensitive
aspects, we now consider the implications of this form of neu-
ronal belief updating and evidence accumulation for neuropsy-
chology.
Prefrontal Neuropsychology
Lesions to the prefrontal cortex in humans have been associated
with various, anatomically sensitive, cognitive impairments
(Szczepanski and Knight 2014). Lateral lesions tend to cause
impairments at delayed response tasks, like that we have
described here (Passingham 1985). Medial (and ventromedial)
lesions have a very different profile (Harlow 1999). Case studies
of patients with these lesions (Papez 1937; Eslinger and Damasio
1985; Damasio et al. 1994) reveal a phenotype that is distinct
from that associated with lateral lesions. Despite retaining a
high level of intelligence—and being unimpaired on classic tests
of frontal lobe function—patients generally lack spontaneous
motivation. The same behavioral phenotype can be found
in patients with lesions in subcortical structures projecting
to this part of cortex (Adam et al. 2013). In this section,
we bring together the ideas we have presented above and
simulate lesions to the lateral and medial parts of our in
silico prefrontal cortex. We do so by disrupting 2 components
of the generative model. Lesions to the lateral prefrontal
cortex are simulated through disruption of the (intrinsic)
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Figure 7.Synthetic prefrontal lesions. In the upper row of this figure,we reproduce the simulated raster plots from Figure 5. In themiddle and lower row,we show raster
plots of the same cells during the same trials (brown noise, followed by an auditory cue to the blue target), but with lesions to the lateral or medial prefrontal cortex.
Lesions to the lateral cortex (middle row) were simulated by using uniform distributions for the transition probabilities associated with the rule hidden state. This
effectively disconnects the B-connections (Fig. 3) for this cell population. Medial lesions (lower row) were simulated by setting the A-connections from the feedback
outcomes to uniform distributions. This disconnects interoceptive regions from the medial prefrontal cortex.
recurrent excitatory connections that we have associated with
rule transition probabilities. To simulate medial lesions, we
disconnect the “feedback” input, simultaneously mirroring the
whitematter disconnections that can induce amedial prefrontal
syndrome (Van Horn et al. 2012) and the “insensitivity to future
consequences” (Bechara et al. 1994) associated with these
patients.
Figure 7 shows the consequences of these lesions for the
trajectories of beliefs throughout a trial. Following a lateral
lesion, the recurrent connectivity that propagates beliefs about
a given time to future time steps has been disrupted. This
means that, as soon as the delay period begins (i.e., the cue is
removed), the belief about the current rule becomes uniform.
This results in a failure to modulate the gain of visual and
auditory inputs following the delay. When opposing stimuli are
presented following the delay, this leads to a failure to infer both
the target and the correct choice.Medial lesions spare inferences
about rules, their propagation to cells representing future times,
and correct contextualization of visual and auditory stimuli,
resulting in a correct inference about the target. However, infer-
ences about the choice remain very uncertain. This is consistent
with the preservation of intelligence and the ability to perform
this kind of task, but the apathy and unusual choices made by
patients with these lesions (Bechara et al. 1998; Bechara 2004).
An inability to make inferences based on feedback might also
account for the perseverative errors observed in patients with
medial prefrontal lesions (Freedman et al. 1998). Perseverative
deficits are also observed in patients with lateral lesions (Nyhus
and Barceló 2009), but our simulations suggest that this could
be due to a failure to propagate beliefs through time to induce
learning, as opposed to a failure to use feedback to update
beliefs.
We note that there are other plausible lesions we could
have made to induce these kinds of deficits. For example, in
place of the intrinsic disconnection we induced among cells
representing the rule, we could have performed an extrinsic
disconnection, rendering the rule and cue conditionally inde-
pendent of one another. In place of the medial disconnection,
we could have disrupted the prior preferences. This speaks
to the possibility that biological lesions may compromise
multiple computational mechanisms, individually or together,
to induce these deficits. The fact that it is possible to specify
a range of plausible lesions means that we have a space of
hypotheses, expressed in terms of the priors accompanying
a generative model. This offers a computational tool to try
to disambiguate between these hypotheses through model
comparison, using patient choice behavior (Schwartenbeck and
Friston 2016; Mirza et al. 2018). This provides an opportunity
to use the same model to assess behavior in mice, where
detailed electrophysiology and optogenetic manipulations
are available, and to answer questions about the computa-
tional deficits that underwrite human neuropsychological
syndromes.
Discussion
The key insight that arises from this approach is that the sort
of computational architecture found in the prefrontal cortex
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closely resembles the anatomy required for inference under
deep temporal models. Specifically, this circuitry is prescribed
by the message passing that solves a minimal generative model
of a task used to investigate prefrontal cortex. This formula-
tion has a practical utility, because choice behavior, and its
electrophysiological correlates, can be predicted from the same
model; by appealing to the Bayesian belief updating used to
infer the appropriate course of action. This offers a formal-
ism to assess the functional circuitry of prefrontal inference
in mouse models, where both behavior and electrophysiology
can be recorded simultaneously. Put simply, the choices made
by a mouse in a given trial constrain the inferences that must
have taken place to give rise to those choices. Comparing these
inferences with single unit recordings from different parts of
prefrontal networks affords an opportunity to associate these
cells with their computational analogues in the network shown
in Figure 3.
Given that we have focused on a task for which animals are
typically over-trained, we have assumed that the structure of
the generative model and its contingencies have been learned
in advance and therefore do not simulate this learning process.
However, it is possible to appeal to the same variational prin-
ciples used to simulate inference to derive the Bayes optimal
updates to beliefs about the parameters of a generative model
(via accumulation of Dirichlet parameters). The form of these
updates (Friston et al. 2016) turns out to resemble activity-
dependent plasticity. For example, in the context of the likeli-
hood distribution, the probability of an outcome given a state is
increased whenever the 2 co-occur, just as the co-occurrence of
pre and postsynaptic depolarization leads to synaptic potentia-
tion (Bliss and Lomo 1973).
This is an important direction to pursue for 2 reasons.
First, this will be crucial in understanding the processes that
underwrite plastic changes in prefrontal cortex during working
memory training (Riley et al. 2018). Second, it will be important
in accounting for certain types of error or bias in these kinds
of task. We could distinguish between 3 sorts of error. One
which is due to false inference, where the wrong distributions
are learned. This could be due to poor quality training data,
or to inappropriate prior beliefs about the parameters. The
second is that the mice learn (correctly) based upon a small
number of trials that they are more likely to select a given
choice. This prior belief would bias future actions (even when
the rewarded choice is fully stochastic) and reinforce this
behavior, i.e., habit formation (FitzGerald et al. 2014). Finally,
the mice might behave for reasons other than achieving
the milk. As we highlighted in the Active Inference section
above, policies that minimize expected free energy are not
always exploitative. There is also value in exploration or
information gain (Itti and Baldi 2006). Given uncertainty about
the contingencies of the task, optimal behavior could include
trying to find out what would happen given a choice (even
if the mouse is confident that the other choice would lead
to milk).
Conclusion
In the above, we demonstrated that the variational solution to
a rule-guided selected attention task requires a computational
architecture that bears a close resemblance to prefrontal cortical
functional connectivity. This facilitates an interpretation of
these connections in terms of the inferential functions they
support. In short, recurrent intracortical excitation might
reflect beliefs about transitions, while lateral inhibition acts
to normalize beliefs about alternatives. The lateral-to-medial
axis of the primate prefrontal cortex appears to reflect an
exteroceptive-to-interoceptive axis and accounts for different
phenotypes corresponding to anatomically distinct prefrontal
regions.
Perhaps unforgivably,we have neglected 2 important features
of prefrontal function. We hope, in future work, to address
the inferential role of the mediodorsal thalamus (Rikhye et
al. 2018), projections from which define prefrontal cortex.
Disruption of activity in this nucleus prevents the performance
of the above task, while stimulation enhances it (Schmitt et
al. 2017). We also aim to understand the perseverative errors
that prefrontal lesions can induce. These reflect a failure
of reversal learning, and the plastic changes underwriting
this should feature in any comprehensive description of the
prefrontal cortex. Despite these omissions, our simulations
revealed a high degree of face validity, reproducing delay-period
responses that are abolished by lesions to lateral intrinsic
connectivity. Furthermore, they make clear predictions about
the sorts of signals that can be measured in the prefrontal
cortex and the consequences to these signals of focal anatomical
lesions.
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Software note
Although the generative model changes from application to
application, the belief updates described in this article are
generic and can be implemented using standard routines (here
spm_MDP_VB_X.m). These routines are available as Matlab code
in the SPM academic software: http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/. Simulations of the sort reported above can be reproduced
(and customized) via a graphical user interface by typing in
>>DEM.
Appendix
In this appendix, we give an outline of the derivations for the
inferential belief update equations and for the equations used
for policy selection. For more technical accounts please see
(Friston et al. 2017a, 2017c).
Inference
The free energy for a given policy is given as
F (π) = EQ
[
lnQ
(
s˜|π)− ln P (o˜, s˜|π)] .
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If we are interested in finding Q(sτ |π), we can omit all terms
that are constant with respect to this
F (π) = EQ(sτ |π) [lnQ (sτ |π)]
− EQ(sτ−1 |π)Q(sτ |π) [lnP (sτ |sτ−1,π)]
− EQ(sτ |π)Q(sτ+1 |π) [lnP (sτ+1|sτ ,π)]
− EQ(sτ |π) [lnP (oτ |sτ )] .
In terms of sufficient statistics, this is
Fπ = sπτ ·
(
ln sπτ − lnBπτ−1sπτ−1
− lnBπτ · sπτ+1 − lnA · oτ
)
.
We can then set up a gradient descent on this using an
auxiliary variable, vπτ :
sπτ = σ (vπτ )
v˙πτ = −∇sFπ = επτ
επτ = lnBπτ−1sπτ−1 + lnBπτ · sπτ+1
+ lnA · oτ − ln sπτ .
Here, σ is a softmax (normalized exponential) function. Fol-
lowing this same line of reasoning, but for multiple factors of
hidden state, and multiple outcome modalities, we reach the
same equation as above, but replace lnA · oτ with∑
m
lnAs\nπτ · omτ
to make inferences about snτ .
The mean field approximation here often leads to overcon-
fident posterior beliefs. In practice, we compensate for this by
using the following expression for the gradient (Parr et al. 2019):
επτ = 12 ln (Bπτ−1sπτ−1) +
1
2
ln
(
B†πτ sπτ+1
)
+ lnA · oτ − ln sπτ ,
where B†πτ is the normalized transpose of Bπτ .
Planning
In order to treat planning as inference (Botvinick and Toussaint
2012), we must define the free energy to include beliefs about
policies. This is
F = π ·
⎛
⎜⎝F+ lnπ− lnπ0︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
⎞
⎟⎠ .
If we set the gradient of the free energy to zero, we find
∇πF = 0 ⇐⇒
π = σ (−F− G) .
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